



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
UNITED STATES ARMY NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION
Unit 21420
APO AE 09705-1420

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

ACRM-MG

APR 27 2006

MEMORANDUM FOR Assistant Secretary of the Army, (Financial Management & Comptroller), ATTN: SAFM-FOI, 109 Army Pentagon, Washington, DC 20310-0109

SUBJECT: Fiscal Year 2006 (FY06) Annual Statement of Assurance (ASA) on Management Controls

1. Headquarters, United States Army, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (HQ USANATO) has evaluated its system of internal controls in effect during FY06 in accordance with the Federal Manager's Financial Integrity Act (FMFIA). Based on that review, as the Deputy Commanding General (Senior Responsible Official) of HQ USANATO, I am providing an "unqualified" statement of assurance. I believe that USANATO has the controls in place necessary to provide reasonable assurance that it can execute its mission effectively and that its critical assets are protected.
2. This assurance, as specified in the Federal Manager's Financial Integrity Act (FMFIA), validates that:
 - a. Obligations and costs are in compliance with applicable laws.
 - b. Funds, property, and other assets are safeguarded against waste, loss, unauthorized use, or misappropriation.
 - c. Revenues and expenditures applicable to USANATO operations are properly recorded and accounted for to permit the preparation of reliable accounting, financial, and statistical reports, and maintain accountability over the assets.
 - d. Programs, administrative and operating functions are efficiently and effectively carried out in accordance with applicable laws and management policies.
 - e. The management control process within USANATO emphasizes prevention of waste, fraud, and mismanagement and stresses timely correction of material weaknesses.
3. The USANATO leadership continued to actively promote management controls as a method to meet the objectives of the FMFIA. Our command encouraged use of automation and web-based technologies to improve awareness and training and maintain a robust management control process within USANATO.


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SUBJECT: Fiscal Year 2006 (FY06) Annual Statement of Assurance (ASA) on Management Controls

4. Tab A, "How the Assessment Was Conducted," is a synopsis of command's activities in support of the management control process. Tab A-1 provides the basis for my determination of reasonable assurance that management controls within USANATO's Assessable Units are working as intended. Tab A-2 provides a summary of leadership efforts in support of our management control process as well as initiatives carried out to strengthen the effective application of management controls and to improve stewardship of command's resources. Tab A-3, "Management Control Program and Related Accomplishments," contains information on management of the Government Travel Charge Card Program.
5. Tab B contains information on the corrected material weakness (MW), Lack of OSD Doctrine to Provide National Support to US Personnel Deployed on NATO Missions (MW MCP #04-001), which was reported in FY 04.
6. USANATO does not have responsibility for accountability for real property or military equipment or responsibility to report environmental projects or hazards. The command has met known requirements for property accountability as documented in annual evaluations of AR 710-2, Supply Policy Below the National Level.
7. The HQ USANATO Inspector General has reviewed and noted the ASA.
8. The Northern Law Center (USAREUR) has reviewed this Annual Statement of Assurance, provided input as required, and attests to its validity.
9. I am committed to sound stewardship of command resources, which can be ensured with effective management controls throughout the USANATO command.
10. Point of contact for this action is: Mr. Mark Bender, USANATO MCA, ODCS G8, DSN: (314) 423-2319 or commercial 011-32-65-44-2319.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Encl


RUSSELL L. FRUTIGER
Brigadier General, US Army
Deputy Commanding General

**HEADQUARTERS,
US ARMY, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY
ORGANIZATION'S (HQ USANATO'S)
FISCAL YEAR 2006 (FY06)
ANNUAL STATEMENT
OF ASSURANCE**

TAB A - How the Assessment Was Conducted

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TAB A-2 - Other Information Required

TAB A-3 - Management Control Program and Related
Accomplishments

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TAB B-1 - List of Material Weaknesses

TAB B-2 - Uncorrected Material Weaknesses

TAB B-3 - Corrected Material Weaknesses

TAB A

**HOW THE HEADQUARTERS,
US ARMY, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY
ORGANIZATION'S (HQ USANATO)
ASSESSMENT WAS CONDUCTED IN
FISCAL YEAR 2006 (FY06)**

TAB A-1

THE BASIS FOR REASONABLE ASSURANCE

1. The determination of reasonable assurance is based on understanding and adhering to the General Accounting Office (GAO) Standards for Internal Control and on a combination of actions taken to ensure that management controls are in place and operating properly throughout the command. Annually, the Command Senior Management Council (SMC) identifies programs applicable to the Command, assesses the risk level, and determines the frequency and method necessary to evaluate the adequacy of management controls to determine if controls are in place and operating adequately. The following is a list of the actions taken to support the mandatory reporting areas established by HQDA. USANATO Assessable Unit Managers (AUM), Management Control Administrators (MCA), and key personnel:

a. Completed all management control evaluations required by the USANATO FY06 MCP Five-Year Plan.

b. Assessable Unit Managers signed their feeder ASAs and unit certification statements.

c. Ensured managers understand and comply with the five GAO Standards established to sustain sound management controls in day-to-day operations.

d. Established policies and specific actions required by Army regulations and other directives.

e. Disseminated information concerning command operations derived from weekly staff meetings, status reports, periodic review, analysis sessions, and other forms of command oversight.

f. Encouraged supervisors to include explicit statements of responsibility in the performance support forms for managers who have specific management control responsibilities.

g. Disseminated management control information and procedures throughout the command.

h. Encouraged managers to actively monitor the effectiveness of management controls so that problems could be detected and corrected before they became material weaknesses.

i. Encouraged the use of alternative inspection methods such as Command Assessment Program (CAP) and Inspector General visits, other independent reports or audits to identify potential management control concerns or problems.

2. The concept of reasonable assurance was applied throughout the assessment process. The command recognizes that the cost of management controls should not exceed the expected benefits. The benefits realized through effective management controls reduce the risk of failing to achieve USANATO's mission objectives. The expected benefits and related costs of management control measures were addressed using managerial judgment.

TAB A-2

OTHER INFORMATION REQUIRED

LEADERSHIP EMPHASIS:

1. Command leaders focused on increasing awareness of management controls through improved communications, training, sharing best practices among Assessable Units (AU), and automation of management control tools and processes. The intent was to increase awareness and strengthen management controls within the AUs.
2. The USANATO Commanding General and each Assessable Unit Manager (AUM) issued guidance memoranda emphasizing the significance of effective management controls and sound stewardship of the command's resources. The memoranda stressed the importance of performing management control evaluations, identifying existing problems, and taking corrective actions as key elements of a successful program. Management control administrators (MCA) posted policy memoranda in common areas for maximum exposure and ensured distribution to subordinate organizations. Memoranda were also posted on the Command's MCP website.
3. The Brigade Commander appointed senior staff to the Senior Management Council (SMC). Comprised of the Chief of Staff, Deputy Chiefs of Staff, Command Inspector General, Command Sergeant Major, and the USANATO MCA, the SMC continued to provide oversight and command emphasis to the management control process.
4. The USANATO MCA:
 - a. Encouraged senior staff to include explicit statements of management control responsibility in performance support forms of SMC members, AUMs, MCAs, and key unit personnel. The Deputy Chief of Staff G8 provided examples of "explicit statements" for different levels of responsibility in MCP Information Paper #1. Supervisors were made aware of their responsibility to evaluate performance against documented standards.
 - b. Emphasized the significance of MCP by posting pictures and articles of management control failures on unit bulletin boards and on the MCP website. The MCA collected and distributed current information to unit MCAs and encouraged them to publicize the information. MCAs posted material which included HQDA and USANATO guidance; GAO Standards; articles from the Government Executive, newspapers, and the internet; POC listing, etc. Some units established bulletin boards in geographically separated work areas to increase awareness.
 - c. Disseminated GAO reports and articles highlighting breakdowns in controls to emphasize the importance of effective management controls within USANATO.
 - d. Prepared and disseminated memoranda from the Deputy Chief of Staff G8 emphasizing the importance of properly managing and accounting for resources and guidance for submitting the annual statement of assurance.

TRAINING:

1. A variety of Management Control training was made available to USANATO personnel. The most frequently used training methods were on-line presentations and certification available at the USANATO MCP and 84th Army Ready Reserve Training Center (ARRTC) websites, MCP presentations on Compact Disc produced by the ARRTC, and standard group presentations. On-line training certification automatically provided the USANATO MCA with the date, title of the training module and personal information of the individual who completed the training. The command increased use of Computer-Based Training to provide flexibility and preserve the command's resources.

a. The USANATO MCA provided one-on-one training to the SHAPE Battalion AUM and Primary MCA and the AFNORTH Battalion AUM.

b. Deputy Chief of Staff G-4, the Deputy Chief of Staff G-6, and USANATO Network Manager completed Management Control Process training available on the USANATO MCP website.

c. The Brigade Alternate MCA completed three MCP training modules through ARRTC: "Introduction to Management Controls," "Management Control Process," and "Becoming a Management Control Administrator."

d. The USANATO MCA trained eight Brigade personnel using the ARRTC CD training module, "Conducting and Documenting Evaluations." The USANATO Five-Year Plan, DA Form 11-2-R templates, and a completed evaluation checklist were used to enhance the information presented during the lesson.

e. Three Brigade evaluators completed the "Conducting and Documenting Evaluations" training module on the ARRTC website.

f. The SHAPE Battalion Alternate MCA completed two MCP training modules on the ARRTC website: "Becoming a Management Control Administrator" and "Conducting and Documenting Evaluations."

g. The AFSOUTH Battalion Alternate MCA completed all nine MCP training modules on the ARRTC website.

h. The AFNORTH Battalion incorporated management control awareness training during OPD and NCOPD sessions.

2. To increase the effective and efficient use of Brigade resources, staff members:

a. Completed an information paper discussing approval/reimbursement for use of official telephones, official faxes, and internet connection, while in a TDY status. Upon approval, this information paper will be distributed to all DD Form 1610 approving officials, commanders, and staff office.

b. Presented Government Travel Card and travel briefings at a Sergeants' Time Training session in October 2005.

c. Trained the SHAPE Battalion budget technician in preparation for transfer of responsibility for the SHAPE Government Travel Card (GTC) program. The SHAPE Battalion budget technician was trained on GTC policies and EAGLS operating procedures; the successful transfer of the SHAPE Battalion Government Travel Card accounts and related responsibilities took place in March 2006.

d. Are developing a Memorandum of Understanding to transfer Base Operations functions and responsibilities from the Brigade to the US Army Garrison-BENELUX. The staff is coordinating this action with HQDA G1 and G3, and HQ Installation Management Agency.

e. Wrote and forwarded to the Chief, International Strategic and Programs Division, HQDA G-3 an information paper on the process of military to civilian conversions for NATO Peacetime Establishment positions.

3. Other training which will contribute to improved resource management within the Command includes:

a. Two management analysts attended a four-day Lean Six Sigma training session hosted by IMA-Europe. Courses of instruction covered Lean Six Sigma, Strategic Planning/Balanced Scorecard Organizational Self-Assessment, Army Performance Improvement Criteria, and Customer Relationship Management.

b. Three management analysts attended the five-day Defense Regional Interservice Support Course conducted by the Army Logistics Management College.

c. One management analyst attended the two-week Manpower and Force Management Course conducted by the Army Logistics Management College.

d. One management analyst attended the two-week Basic Force Management Course conducted by the Army Force Management School.

e. The Brigade Travel Coordinator completed Defense Travel System (DTS) training, and the Budget NCO completed Government Purchase Card training.

4. Other training which will contribute to improved resource management within the command includes:

a. Two hundred Soldiers completed Individual Deployment Training (IDT) to ensure their readiness for deployment to the NATO-commanded International Security Assistance Force-Afghanistan, and NATO Training Mission-Iraq. The IDT program includes training modules on Combat First Aid, Marksmanship, Mounted/Dismounted Operations, Convoy Operations, NBC

training, etc. IDT culminates with a two-day Soldier Training Exercise with various mounted and dismounted scenarios.

5. Throughout the fiscal year, the HQ USANATO MCA:

a. Continued to refer MCAs and managers to HQDA and ARRTC MCP websites for additional sources of information.

b. Distributed articles on management control issues and special interest items relating to MCP and risk management.

EXECUTION:

1. The HQ USANATO MCA:

a. Developed the agenda for the initial SMC meeting to adopt the USANATO FY06 MCP Five-Year Plan. The SMC reviewed the HQDA Army Management Control Evaluation Checklist Inventory and the USANATO FY05 Five-Year Plan to identify programs that applied to the current USANATO mission. As a result of this analysis, four evaluations were deleted due to two subordinate functions being realigned to other commands.

b. Distributed the FY06 MCP Five-Year Plan and HQDA/USANATO FY06 ASA submission guidance to AUMs and MCAs in February 2006 to encourage identification of deficiencies or weaknesses in their operations and the opportunity to correct them before they became material weaknesses and negatively impact mission accomplishment.

c. Disseminated MCP policy guidance from DoD, HQDA, and Command to subordinate levels in all areas of program management.

d. Provided website addresses for direct access to the evaluation inventory and other related information on the USANATO MCP Website.

e. Stressed the importance of conducting all scheduled evaluations and maintaining proper documentation IAW AR 11-2 and GAO Standards in preparation of the FY06 Annual Statement of Assurance.

f. Performed a detailed review of all feeder statements, certification statements and management control evaluations and collected supporting documentation that verified key management controls were tested.

g. Publicized DoD and HQDA Systemic Material Weaknesses by posting information on command bulletin boards and providing a link on the command MCP website. The Auditor General and DoD IG specifically identified DoD Systemic Material Weaknesses for general awareness, possible identification of potential problems in each command's respective areas, and taking timely preventive or corrective measures.

i. Maintained beneficial contacts with command/agency MCAs, including ASA (FM&C), to exchange ideas and expertise and improve internal processes.

j. Ensured USANATO MCP key players were formally appointed and updated appointment letters when required by personnel changes. Updated and maintained the MCP POC listing and forwarded updates to HQDA.

k. Continued to impress upon AUMs and MCAs the importance of using alternative evaluation methods such as the CAP, Command Supply Discipline Program (CSDP), and Physical Security Inspection program to avoid duplication of effort in evaluating key management controls.

2. The SMC elected to evaluate 25 key management control evaluations; 17 of those areas are evaluated more often than required by HQDA.
3. USANATO staff proponents developed 13 checklists to evaluate areas of interest when management control checklists were not focused on the command's mission or when checklists were not included in the governing regulation. Command developed checklists were used to evaluate four functions that were not included on the HQDA Army Management Control Evaluation Checklist Inventory; "Army Training and Education," "Physical Security Program," "Line of Duty Investigations," and "Army Casualty Operations/Assistance/Insurance." To comply with a USAAA recommendation, checklists were formatted "to ensure that methodology personnel use to test controls is fully documented and explained."
4. HQ Brigade budget analysts reviewed and promptly reconciled monthly billing statements, demonstrating knowledge of, and adherence to, regulations governing the GTC Program. (See accomplishments for more detail)
5. The command continues to cross-walk MCP and CAP checklists to fully integrate updated MCP information. Updated CAP checklists, when submitted in lieu of MCP checklists, provide AUMs and the SRO reasonable assurance that controls are in place and operating adequately.

TAB A-3
MANAGEMENT CONTROL PROGRAM AND
RELATED ACCOMPLISHMENTS

Government Travel Charge Card Program

Description of the Issue: Transfer responsibility of the Government Travel Charge Card Program management from the Brigade Agency Program Coordinator (APC) to the SHAPE Battalion budget technician. The SHAPE Battalion was the only Assessable Unit that was not responsible for GTC program management.
Accomplishment:
The Brigade APC identified actions required to transfer GTC accountability from the Brigade to SHAPE Battalion
The Brigade APC provided one-on-one training on the Electronic Account Government Ledger Systems (EAGLS) and its various reports. Training included: <ul style="list-style-type: none">- Processing new and reinstatement applications, deactivating and closing accounts, researching accounts and contacting the bank to resolve issues- Reactivating and transferring accounts to the Battalion hierarchy- Downloading and interpreting reports- Problem case resolution
The Battalion APC was trained on interpreting HQDA reports and how to accomplish reports required by HQ DA
One hundred sixty accounts and supporting documentation was transferred to the Battalion APC upon completion of training
The Battalion Commander and Command Sergeant Major now have complete control over this high-visibility program

TAB B
MATERIAL WEAKNESSES

TAB B-1
LIST OF MATERIAL WEAKNESSES

	TITLE OF MATERIAL WEAKNESS	FY IDENTIFIED
CORRECTED MATERIAL WEAKNESS	Lack of OSD Doctrine to Provide National Support to US Personnel Deployed on NATO Missions MW #MCP 04-001	2004

TAB B-2
UNCORRECTED MATERIAL WEAKNESSES

TAB B-2
USANATO DOES NOT HAVE
UNCORRECTED MATERIAL WEAKNESSES
TO REPORT

TAB B-3
LIST OF CORRECTED MATERIAL
WEAKNESSES

Headquarters, United States Army, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(HQ USANATO)
Corrected Material Weakness

HQ USANATO MW #MCP 04-001

Title and Description of Material Weakness: Absence of US Doctrine for Operational Support for US Army Personnel assigned to NATO.

There is no US Operational Doctrine, policy or procedure for resourcing and providing unit-level support to US personnel assigned to NATO positions who are preparing for, and deploying on NATO operational missions.

Whereas US Army North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) based at SHAPE (Casteau, Belgium) is a US Army support element with the primary mission to exercise command and control and provide logistical and administrative support to US Army forces assigned in garrison to NATO positions, this function is fundamentally inhibited when it comes to operational support. Principally because there is no overarching Department of the Army policy or doctrine that guides and sets parameters for the training, funding, equipping, in-theater support and accountability of US personnel who deploy on NATO operational missions.

1. Lack of resources to support US personnel training and preparing to deploy on NATO operations.

USANATO is organized as a TDA-based (non-deploying) headquarters, yet has the mission to train and support soldiers who deploy on NATO missions into operational/combat zones. At present USANATO performs this deployment mission while constrained by a TDA organizational structure/manning document. There are no other similar service elements capable of providing this type of support, which even further exacerbates an already strained operation.

During the NATO deployment to the Balkans in 1995 there was no imperative for doctrine to cover support to NATO operational missions. This trend continued up to the 2002 Prague Summit. NATO was essentially an in-garrison operation with minimal and ad-hoc deployments. But the face of NATO has changed. NATO restructuring and greater participation in out-of-area operations has highlighted the need for unprecedented levels of soldier deployment readiness. Nothing expresses this more profoundly than the tip of the NATO operational spear, the NATO Response Force (NRF) and the NRF Five Day Notice-to-Move (NTM) requirement which was officially launched at the Prague Summit. The Five Day NTM requires all NATO troops on the NRF rotation to be equipped, trained and ready to deploy world-wide with five days notice.

Headquarters Deployable Joint Task Force (DJTF) is the command and control element of an NRF deployment. HQ DJTF is made up of personnel from all NATO nations including the United States. The DJTF mission rotates every year between the three NATO Operational Headquarters (Joint Force Command Headquarters North, Brunssum, Joint Force Command Headquarters South, Naples and Joint Headquarters, Lisbon). The implication of this is that every year there are up to eighty US personnel in NATO positions who are in highly-deployable,

rapid reaction status who are supported by a US element that is not funded or resourced to deploy them. In addition to the HQ DJTF rotation, the Istanbul Summit 2004 has introduced a greater potential for US personnel in NATO billets to deploy in support of Operation Iraq Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). The numbers of US personnel deploying on NATO missions will only increase in the future, not decrease, as NATO engages more extensively in out of area missions.

In practical terms, this means that there are significant material weaknesses in the three NATO geographic regions (North, South and West) as follows:

- A lack of proper weapons storage facilities in all regions but critical in JFC South (Madrid and Naples).
- A lack of deployment equipment storage space for operational equipment across the environmental spectrum, JSLISTS, IBA in all regions but critical in JFC South (Madrid).
- Lack of facilities in all regions to weapons qualify and train in NBC equipment.
- Lack of storage capability/facilities for ICE packs.
- Lack of storage facilities for ammunition basic loads for issue to deployment soldiers.

As a result of NATO's NRF initiative and the requirement for a five day NTM, it is imperative for NRF forces to have the ability to store all equipment required for multi-seasonal, multi-theater deployments (i.e., cold weather equipment, hot weather equipment, etc). Additionally, any current and/or established support element requires the same ability.

2. Lack of OSD Policy to provide in-theater national support to US personnel deployed on NATO missions into operational/combat zones.

It is implicit within the NATO deployment orders that nations will prepare and deploy their personnel, and provide their own national support elements (NSE). This includes the NSE ability to sustain national personnel once in theater.

In response to this requirement, two years ago, USANATO developed a Deployable Support Team (DST) concept. DSTs are configured depending upon the mission, but range from two to five soldier teams. A DST deploys in support of US personnel on NATO missions and can provide Personnel Support Services (PSS) and Supply Services (inc. Ammunition, Weapons, Resupply). DSTs are comprised of US personnel assigned to USANATO who are specially trained and certified to operate as a self contained element in austere conditions. USANATO has deployed DSTs to Turkey in support of OIF and Afghanistan to support the ISAF mission.

This said, there is a profound incongruity between US personnel in NATO positions deploying under a NATO Deployment order and the national DST's ability to deploy at the same time. Here is why: NATO Statement of Requirements is often a purely combat capabilities based document and not an integrated Combat, Combat Support and Combat Service Support document, i.e. it is currently NATO's policy that support services for units slotted against the Statement Of Requirements (SOR) is a national responsibility. So whereas on the one hand NATO places responsibility for national support on the national element, there is no national

support element built into the NATO Crisis Establishment (CE) Deployment Force Structure. Nations are expected to deploy their support elements under national authority, not NATO authority. Therefore there are two differing deployment approval timelines for combat units and its corresponding supporting elements. This has proven to be decidedly impractical. For example, the NRF is tasked for a deployment timeline within five days of notification; however, US Army supporting units not under the NATO command need Secretary of Defense and Joint Chief of Staff (SECDEF/JCS) approval. Historically this has taken up to three months to be approved, or worse to be disapproved.

The most biting example of this incongruity of “deploying timelines” was experienced in Aug 03 by USANATO when trying to implement the support piece to sixty US personnel who deployed to Afghanistan as part of the NATO, HQ ISAF mission in Kabul. When NATO assumed responsibility for ISAF IV, the contributing nations were directed in NATO OPLAN 10419 to provide their own national support and as stated above, authorization for deploying national support elements resides with the SECDEF/JCS. USANATO duly requested authority through JCS to deploy a DST - a small four man national support element - to Kabul. The request was disapproved and instead CJCS issued an EXORD “chopping” ISAF US personnel to USCENTCOM/CJTF-180 for national support. CJTF-180 received the EXORD but did not send unit level support to Kabul. Between Aug and Oct 03, ISAF US personnel were regularly pulled from NATO positions to carry out national support requirements. NATO Commanders raised concerns about mission accomplishment and force protection. Quality of life began to suffer. The Senior National Representative (SNR) repeatedly requested unit level support in Kabul. Finally CJTF-180 CJ1 stated definitively that CJTF-180 would not send a National Support Element (NSE) to Kabul. Based on this, USANATO aggressively resumed staff action to get national support in Kabul and were instrumental in obtaining the final CJCS Deployment Order (DEPOD) to deploy a DST from USANATO.

CJCS made their decision to disapprove DST deployment without fully understanding NATO policy on national support. In the absence of doctrine, a decision was made that put a severe strain on US personnel deployed in a combat zone and left US Forces for four months as the only nation with NATO HQ ISAF in Kabul without an organic national support element. However, once the deployment of a DST was approved, the absence of doctrine resulted in soldiers deploying to a combat environment for 21 days before finally receiving ammunition.

Conclusion

NATO agreements with Nations place the responsibility for individual training and preparation for deployments, and unit level support during deployment, wholly on the shoulders of those nations, to include the US. NATO will provide basic training and basic billeting and messing, but does not provide the additional requirements associated with preparation and execution of a fully fledged operational deployment mission. Thus all pre-deployment national training, ammunition resupply, weapon replacement and maintenance, resupply of NBC equipment, field personnel support, casualty support and mail, to name a few key support services, must be provided by the nations. USANATO, as the national unit supporting US personnel assigned to NATO, is resourced and guided doctrinally to provide them garrison support but so far the policy and doctrine that guides the support to US personnel for operational missions does not exist.

USANATO has de facto assumed this responsibility. Between 2000 - 2004, USANATO has developed “work-arounds” to support US personnel deployed on NATO missions in-lieu of Army operational doctrine but the long term sustainment of this ad hoc support is untenable, particularly as manning and financial resources never designed for operational use are being tapped more and more. Lack of US Doctrine to support US personnel in NATO deployable positions is a serious material weakness that compromises the readiness, safety, security and morale of US soldiers who are deploying into combat zones.

Functional Category: Force Readiness/Resource Management/Support Services

Pace of Corrective Action:

Year Identified: FY 2004

Original Target Date: FY 2005

Target Date in Last Year’s Report: FY 2007

Current Target Date: FY 2006

Reason for Change in Date(s): Material Weakness is resolved.

Validation Process: That US policy and resources are in place to support current and future operational deployments of US personnel assigned to, or in support of, NATO.

Results Indicators: DA funding, personnel and logistics are documented and Joint Staff procedures include US national support on the NATO Combined Joint Statement of Requirements (CJSOR).

Source(s) Identifying Weakness: HQ USANATO G3

Major Milestones in Corrective Action:

A. Completed Milestones:

Date: Sep 2005 Milestone: The HQDA ODCS, G-3/5/7 reviewed the Material Weakness, but “determined that the conditions for an Army Material Weakness have not been met.” In a letter dated 8 Sep 05, the HQDA ODCS, G-3/5/7 stated, “...In view of the ongoing USEUCOM effort to develop the JNSE concept and eventual approval required from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense for this concept, I do not believe bringing this issue to the attention of the Secretary of Defense or his staff as a Material Weakness is currently necessary.”

Date: Mar 2006 Milestone: Resources are now either in-place or have been addressed towards resolution with the appropriate agencies. The US National Support Element is now identified on the NATO Combined Joint Statement of Requirements (CJSOR). This visibility allows for US sourcing of support personnel to a specific theater in support of NATO-assigned personnel. The US Army NATO G3 will follow-up with the SHAPE US National Military Representative to ensure the Joint Staff has a documented process in-place for NATO CJSORs which will be applied to future NATO operations. (Fiscal Year 2006).

Point of Contact: Mr. Mark V. Bender, HQ USANATO MCA, DSN: (314) 423-2319 or
Commercial: 011-32-65-44-2319.